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Abstract 
The criterion of cost-effectiveness in health management may be given a welfare-
theoretical justification if people are risk neutral with respect to life years. With risk
aversion, the optimal allocation of health expenditures change: Compared to the cost-
effective allocation, more resources should be allocated to health cases for which the
expected outcomes even after treatment are worse than average. The consequences of
medical interventions are usually not known with certainty. Given this type of
uncertainty, simple application of cost-effectiveness analysis would recommend
maximization of expected health benefits given the health budget. We show that when
people are risk averse with respect to the number of life years they live, the uncertainty
associated with different types of interventions should play a role on allocating the
health budget.3
1.  Introduction 
To prioritize among different types of health expenditures, economists often argue that
cost-effectiveness analysis should play an important role. Cost-effectiveness is defined
as the minimum cost for a given health benefit, or equivalently, maximal health
benefits for given expenditures on health care. To be able to use such an analysis, one
needs some measure of “health benefits”. While some analyses simply used the sum of
life years saved due to a medical intervention, is more common so also take
improvements in health status into account.  A frequently used measure combining the
number of lives lived and the health quality of these years is “quality adjusted life
years”, or QALYs.  The use of QALYs as a welfare measure, and as an appropriate
variable in cost-effectiveness analyses, has been extensively discussed in the
literature.
1 
A number of authors have criticized the simple use of “minimum cost per QALY” 
as a criterion for allocating the health budget. A main criticism has been that the
summation of QALYs across individuals lacks a good ethical or welfare theoretical
basis, see e.g. Harris (1987), Wagstaff (1991), Nord (1994), Olsen (1997) and Dolan
(1998). The criterion of cost-effectiveness may, however, be given a welfare-
theoretical justification under certain circumstances: Imagine that a person must
choose all health expenditures behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, i.e. before he/she
knows his/her health state. If this person has preferences satisfying the axioms of
expected utility theory, a cost-effective allocation of health expenditures will be
optimal, provided the person is risk neutral with respect to his or her number of life
years. However, risk neutrality with respect to life years is not a particularly realistic
assumption (see e.g. the discussion given by Bleichrodt (1995)). In this paper we
therefore consider how risk aversion with respect to life years affects the optimal
allocation of health expenditures.
                                             
1 See e.g. Weinstein and Stason (1977), Pliskin et al. (1980), Mehrez and Gafni (1989), Broome (1993),
Johannesson and Weinstein (1993), Gabler and Phelps (1997), Bleichrodt and Quiggin (1999), and Nord (1999).4
The consequences of medical interactions are usually not known with certainty. Given
this type of uncertainty, cost-effectiveness analysis is typically formulated as a
recommendation to maximize expected health benefits given the health budget. We
show that when people are risk averse with respect to the number of life years they
live, the uncertainty associated with different types of interventions should play a role
on allocating the health budget.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The main assumption regarding types of
health states and preferences over these is given in Section 2. We avoid the use of the
QALY concept, as it can be argued that QALYs can only be a representation of
individual life cycle preferences if people are risk neutral with respect to life years (see
Pliskin et al. (1980), Bleichrodt (1995) and Bleichrodt et al. (1997)). Instead, we use
the concept of “healthy year equivalents”, or HYEs (see e.g Mehrez and Gafni (1989),
Culyer and Wagstaff (1993), Gafni et al. (1993), and Bleichrodt (1995) for a
discussion of this concept)
2. In Section 3 we derive the allocation of health
expenditures that would be chosen by a person deciding behind the Rawlsian veil of
ignorance. The special cases of risk neutrality and no uncertainty regarding health
outcomes for a given health state are discussed in Sections 4 and 5, before the
properties of the general case are discussed in Section 6. A brief summary of the main
conclusions is given in Section 7.
2. Health states.
A health profile is characterized by a particular lifetime and a particular time profile of
various health attributes during this lifetime. We assume that at the ex ante stage when
people do not know their health profile, they have an identical preference ordering
over health profiles. Moreover, we assume that for every health profile we can define a
“healthy year equivalent” (HYE), i.e. a specific number of years in perfect health that
                                                                                                                                            
2 If we are only concerned with the number of life years, and not the health quality of these years, both HYEs
and QALYs are identical to the number of years lived. Moreover, if preferences have the property that they can5
the decision-maker regards as equivalent to the health profile considered. In this way,
each health profiles may be summarized by a single number measuring “health
standard” by HYEs. 
We assume that there are m different health states at the ex ante stage, with health state
i having probability pi of occurring. Let hi denote the number of HYEs in health state i.
Obviously hi will depend on what health care one is given. Moreover, for a given level
of health care in a state i, the number of HYEs is generally random. The number of
HYEs in health state i is thus given by a function hi(ci;θ), where the uncertainty is
represented by the parameter θ, with each realization having a known probability qθ. In
particular, the HYEs in the absence of any treatment in health state i is hi(0;θ). By
assumption, the hi functions are increasing in their first arguments. Moreover, we shall
simplify our analysis by assuming that all hi functions are differentiable and concave
in their first argument. More precisely, using hi’ and hi’’ to denote first and second
order derivatives with respect to ci, we assume that hi’≥0 and that hi’’<0 for all hi’>0.
In reality, as health expenditure increases, there will typically be stages where one
moves from one type of treatment to another. Therefore, the function may be
discontinuous, and certainly non-differentiable, at some points. However, for the
general ideas presented in this paper this is of minor importance. We therefore stick to
our analytically simple hi functions.
The decision-maker is assumed to have a von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function
over HYEs, denoted by U(hi(ci; θ)). This function is assumed to be strictly increasing
and concave. The case of risk neutrality in life years is a limiting case. For the case of
risk aversion in life years U is strictly concave.
                                                                                                                                            
be represented by the number of QALYs, then this number is equal to the number of HYEs (see Bleichrodt
(1995).6
3. The optimal allocation of the health budget
At the level of the society, the probabilities pi are shares of persons in each of the m
health states. From the notation of the previous sections we can write the government’s
budget constraint (per capita) as
  C c p
i i i ∑ ≤ (1)
where C is an exogenously given health budget. 
The decision-maker must choose all health expenditures cj behind a veil of ignorance,
and does this so that his or her expected utility is maximized
3. In other words, the
following maximization problem is solved
Maximize  () ( ) ∑ θ θ θ
, ;
i i i i c h U q p    subject to (1) (2)
which gives the optimality condition
() ( ) () { } λ θ θ = ′ ; ' ; i i i i c h c h U E     i=1,…,m (3)
or, equivalently
() () ( ) () ( ) {} λ θ θ θ θ = ′ + ⋅ ′ ; , ; cov ) ; ( ' ; i i i i i i i i c h c h U c Eh c h U E     i=1,…,m     (4)
Before discussing the general case, we shall briefly consider two special cases in the
next two sections.
                                             
3 A similar approach is used by Pratt and Zeckhauser (1996) for a related problem.7
4. The special case of risk neutrality







c Eh i i
λ
θ = (5)
It follows from (5) that under risk neutrality the optimal allocation is characterized by
the expected marginal health benefits (measured by HYEs) of additional health
expenditures being the same for all types of health expenditures. This is the same
allocation as one would get from maximizing the sum of expected HYEs for a given
budget for the sum of direct health expenditures. In the literature, this allocation is
often referred to as the cost-effective allocation, see e.g. Weinstein and Stason (1977)
for a further discussion.
5. The special case of a health state defining a non-random health outcome
As mentioned in the Introduction, it seems plausible that people are risk averse with
respect to lifetime, and thus with respect to HYEs. Let us first ignore uncertainty
regarding health outcomes for a given health state. Formally, let hi depend only on ci,
and not on θ. If this is the case, we can rewrite (3) as
() () λ = ⋅ ′ ) ( ' i i i i c h c h U     i=1,…,m     (6)
It is clear from (6) (and the concavity of the functions U and hi) that the health budget
should be allocated so that the marginal health benefits (measured by HYEs) of
additional health expenditures should be higher in states where the equilibrium number
of HYEs is low than when this number is high. In other words, risk aversion implies
that health expenditures directed towards more serious health problems (measured by
HYEs) should be given a higher priority than they would in the simple case of cost
effectiveness. 8
6. The general case of uncertain health consequences of health care 
We want to investigate the consequences of uncertainty of a specific health defect j.
To do this, let the functions hi(ci;θ) be given for all i≠j. We compare the case of
uncertainty in the relationship between cj and hj with the case of certainty where the
certain relationship between health expenditure and HYEs is equal to the expected
value of the function hj(cj;θ), denoted Ehj(cj;θ). (The latter case corresponds to the
degenerate case in which the function values hj(cj;θ) are independent of the value of
θ). Since we are changing the hj-function for only one j, it is reasonable to expect λ to
have (approximately) the same value for the two cases compared. 
Assume first that the marginal health benefit of health expenditures in health state j is
non-random, i.e. that hj‘(cj;θ) is independent of θ. This means that although health
outcomes may be uncertain, the differences in health outcomes due to different levels
of  health care are certain. In this case the covariance term in (4) is zero. The l.h.s. of
(4) is larger or smaller with uncertainty than without, depending on whether E(U’) is
larger or smaller under uncertainty than under certainty. This in turn depends on the
sign of U’’’. If U’’’ is positive (as it is e.g. under constant relative risk aversion), then
E(U’) is larger under uncertainty than under certainty. From the second order
condition of the optimization problem, it therefore follows that health expenditure
directed towards health defect j should be higher under uncertainty than under
certainty. The opposite will be true if U’’’ is negative.
To see the importance of the covariance term in (4), let us now assume that U’’’=0.
From the result above we know that if the covariance term in (4) is zero,  then the
health expenditure directed towards health defect j should not be affected by the
presence of uncertainty. Consider next the case in which
( ) ( ) ( ) { } 0 ; ' , ; cov > ′ θ θ j j j j c h c h U (7)9
For any level of health expenditure, U’ is lower for “good” values of θ than for “bad”
values of θ (since U’’<0). The assumption (7) therefore means that the marginal
benefit of health care (measured in HYEs) is lower for good health outcomes than for
low health outcomes. In other words, health care reduces the uncertainty of the health
outcome. 
When U’’’=0 and (7) holds, the l.h.s. of (4) is higher under uncertainty than under
certainty. From the second order condition of the optimization problem, it therefore
follows that health expenditures directed towards health defect j should be higher
under uncertainty than under certainty.
Consider the opposite case from  (7), i.e. 
( ) ( ) ( ) { } 0 ; ' , ; cov < ′ θ θ j j j i c h c h U (8)
In this case health care increases the uncertainty of the health outcome. We then get
the opposite conclusion from above: Health expenditures directed towards health
defect i should be lower under uncertainty than under certainty when U’’’=0 and (9)
holds.
7. A comparison with a simple rule of cost-effectiveness
We have shown that a simple type of cost-effectiveness is optimal if the decision-
maker is risk neutral with respect to life years. With risk aversion, the optimal
allocation of health expenditures changed. The analysis indicates how the optimal
allocation deviates from the cost-effective allocation. Loosely speaking, we have
shown the following:
•  More resources should be allocated to health cases for which the expected
outcomes even after treatment are worse than average.10
•  If the utility function has the property that U’’’>0 (implied by e.g. constant risk
aversion), more resources should be allocated to cases for which the health
outcome is more uncertain than average, unless the treatment increases this
uncertainty.
•  Even if medical treatment for a particular health defect increases the uncertainty of
the health outcome, it is not obvious that less resources should be allocated to such
a health defect than to a health defect with a less uncertain development, since we
cannot rule out the possibility that U’’’<0.
 11
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